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ABSTRACT: 
 
This paper investigates the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decision 
for publicly listed companies in Malaysia for the period of 2002-2011. Pooled OLS, fixed effect 
method (FEM) panel models and Tobit regressions are employed to examining the relationship 
between managerial overconfidence, government ownership, and leverage decision of publicly 
listed companies in Malaysia. This is the first study that empirically examines the impact of 
managerial overconfidence by testing CEO personal characteristics as a main independent variable 
on corporate financing decision for Malaysian firms. We also make the first attempt to test the 
moderating effect of government ownership on the relationship of managerial overconfidence and 
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leverage decision. We conclude that (1) CEO overconfidence is significantly and negatively 
related to corporate financing decision and it is consistent with prior studies. (2) A higher degree 
of managerial overconfidence would result in lower leverage in GLCs, whereas the effect does not 
significantly exist in NGLCs. (3) A larger ownership of government in a firm will reduce the 
negative effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decision. The finding implies 
that moderating effect of government ownership on the association between managerial 
overconfidence and corporate financing decision in GLCs is more effective than NGLCs.  
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